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ABSTRACT
We study how provider choice in workers' compensation cases affects costs and outcomes. When
employees choose the provider, costs are higher and return-to-work outcomes are worse, while
physical recovery is the same although satisfaction with medical care is higher. The higher costs and
worse return-to-work outcomes associated with employee choice arise largely when employees
selected a new provider, rather than a provider with whom the worker had a pre-existing relationship.
The findings lend some support to recent policy changes limiting workers' ability to choose a
provider with whom they do not have a prior relationship.
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As health care costs in workers’ compensation have grown rapidly and become an 
increasingly important proportion of system benefits, more attention has focused on the choice of 
provider (National Academy of Social Insurance, 2004).  Selection of the provider is critical to 
both workers and employers because health care providers in workers’ compensation influence 
whether the worker is eligible for benefits, the nature and cost of care, the extent of disability and 
hence the amount of income benefit payments, and the timing of return to work.  
Workers and their advocates have argued that provider choice should be left to the 
worker.
1  At a minimum, they argue that workers should be treated by those they trust and whose 
interests line up with the worker – interests that encourage prompt return to work, but only as 
medically indicated, and the fullest restoration possible of physical capacity (Ellenberger, 1992).  
In contrast, employer advocates argue that choice should be made by the employer because 
without employer choice there is “… little incentive to see that the costs of care remain reasonable 
and appropriate …” (Morrison, 1990).  Employer advocates also argue that “[e]mployer selection 
of the treating physician serves to direct injured workers away from those providers who provide 
excessive services and treatment procedures,” and to “retain those providers familiar with the 
operations of the employer and who can expedite return-to-work based on that knowledge” 
(National Federation of Independent Business Research Foundation and National Foundation for 
Unemployment Compensation and Workers’ Compensation, n.d.). 
The issue of provider choice is more complex than simply deciding which party shall 
choose the initial provider, because there are often changes in providers associated with 
dissatisfaction with treatment or the need for specialized care.  Thus, state workers’ compensation 
laws regulate both who may select the initial provider and the circumstances under which a change 
of provider is permitted.  
2 
More important, although typically posed as a simply dichotomy of employer versus 
employee choice, workers’ compensation laws occasionally draw distinctions between employee 
choice of a new provider as opposed to a provider who treated them previously.  A recent example 
of this comes from the 2004 workers’ compensation reforms in California (Senate Bill 899).  
Previously in California, the employer had the right to select the initial provider unless the 
employee had predesignated a provider, but after 30 days workers had the right to change to a 
medical provider of their own choice.  Under the most recent reforms, however, employers are 
allowed to establish networks composed of both occupational and non-occupational physicians, 
and the legislation grants to the employer (or the insurer) the sole right to decide which medical 
providers are in the network.  Furthermore, the right of workers to choose their physician after 30 
days no longer applies if a network is established that complies with the law, unless the worker 
has predesignated a physician under particular conditions, most importantly that the physician was 
previously the worker’s primary provider of medical care under an employer-provided group 
health plan.
2 In general, as long as employers establish networks, which many are expected to do, 
workers will have less scope to choose their physician.  Most importantly, workers’ ability to seek 
out a new physician after an injury will be curtailed most severely.  
The purpose of this study is to determine whether who selects the provider, and the choice 
of prior versus new providers when employees choose, affect measurable costs and outcomes in 
workers’ compensation cases.  The costs and outcomes we study include medical and indemnity 
(income benefit) costs, the duration of time out of work, the likelihood that the worker had a 
substantial return to employment, the worker’s own perception of the degree of recovery from the 
work injury, and the worker’s overall satisfaction with the health care received.  We use detailed 
data on workers’ compensation claims coupled with interviews of workers.  Workers (and 
employers) exert some choice over who chose the provider; while state law dictates which party  
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has the right to choose the provider, in practice this right is not always exercised.  As a 
consequence, we pay particular attention to trying to sort out causal effects of variation in provider 
choice from differences attributable to selection.  In our view, the very rich data available for this 
study permit us, by and large, to rule out endogenous selection as the source of our results.    
II. Literature Review  
 
In general, studies of the effects of provider choice on workers’ compensation outcomes 
have reached mixed conclusions.  Based on average annual changes in medical payments in 
workers’ compensation cases in 41 states from 1965 to 1985, Boden and Fleischman (1989) found 
little relationship at the state level between the state’s approach to provider choice and the rate of 
medical cost growth.  During the period in question eight states changed their laws – two switched 
to employee choice and six switched to employer choice.  Boden and Fleischman did not find 
evidence that changing the method of choice was correlated with cost changes after the change 
was made.  Nor was there evidence that states that remained employer choice states over the 20 
years studied tended to have lower rates of medical cost growth. 
Subsequently, Victor and Fleischman (1990) employed multivariate methods and 
concluded that the choice of provider does affect medical payments.  Using data from state rating 
bureaus and state funds (excluding self-insurers), they examined the impact of a change in 
provider choice in Illinois (after 1975) and Texas (after 1973).  They reported that medical 
payments in Illinois rose 8-11 percent following a change to employee choice in the short run, and 
19-49 percent when the full impact of the change was absorbed.  In Texas, the short run effect was 
4-6 percent, while the ultimate impact was estimated to be 7-29 percent.  The authors emphasize 
the tentative nature of these results, partly because they use aggregate (not claim level) data and 
have a small sample, problems that the current study overcomes.  In a later paper, Boden reports 
that of eight states analyzed, costs might have been affected in three of them when the state’s  
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approach to choice of provider was changed, but that in five of the states there was “no evidence 
that these changes triggered changes in medical payments” (Boden, 1992, p. 45). 
Durbin and Appel (1991) studied average state medical payments in the years 1965 to 
1984.  Employing multivariate analysis, they reported that states with employer choice had 15 
percent lower average medical payments in 1965, and that the difference widened to 36.5 percent 
in 1984.  Their results also suggested that physician choice has a greater impact on medical 
payments than do fee schedules. 
The most data-intensive study of the issue of provider choice was conducted by Pozzebon 
(1994), whose findings differ from those of Durbin and Appel.  She relied on data from almost 
32,000 closed claims obtained from the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) for 
17 states for the years 1979-1987.  Using medical payments per claim as the dependent variable, 
Pozzebon created four variables as her statutory choice measures: initial choice was limited; 
changing the provider was limited; no limits placed on employee initial choice or on subsequent 
changes; and both initial choice and subsequent choice were limited.  She found that where the 
employee’s initial choice was constrained “Restrictions on initial choice increase health costs in 
workers’ compensation programs by 11-16 percent, a large and statistically significant effect …” 
(Pozzebon, 1994, p. 161).  Limits on changing the provider subsequent to the initial choice were 
found to be correlated with higher medical payments also.  However, she acknowledged that these 
findings could result from higher costs leading to policies to limit change, rather than cost-
increasing effects of policies limiting choice.  Pozzebon’s somewhat unexpected findings do not 
seem attributable simply to the source of the data used.  In a 1996 study, Durbin, et al., also used 
NCCI data, and found that employer choice was associated with lower costs of medical benefits.  
However, the sample in this latter study was more limited, including 1,300 claims each for four 
states with 1987 as the injury year and closing dates between 1988 and 1992.  
5 
The only study of provider choice in workers’ compensation that uses rigorous 
experimental methods was one that compared experimental and control groups where workers in 
the former were treated in a managed care framework while workers in the latter group selected 
their own provider in a traditional fee-for-service arrangement (Washington Department of Labor 
and Industries and University of Washington Department of Health Services, 1997).  Firms, and 
not individual workers, were placed in the experimental or control group.  The study tracked 1,354 
injury cases with treatment in managed care and 1,708 cases from firms in the control group.  For 
our purposes, this study had one significant difficulty – namely, the differences between the 
groups were more than solely who selected the provider.  Among other differences was the 
method of payment to the providers for either group.  But the study was also an important 
extension of earlier studies since the outcomes analyzed were more extensive than simply medical 
payments per case. 
The study found that workers in the managed care settings had medical payments that were 
27-32 percent below those in the traditional employee choice fee-for-service model.  The study 
also compared rates of injured workers who received “time loss costs,” role functioning scores (a 
self-reported measure of how well the individual was able to carry out activities related to personal 
and social roles), and self-reported opinions on the progress of recovery and on overall outcomes.  
Workers were surveyed both at six weeks and six months after their injury.  Workers treated in the 
managed care setting reported statistically significantly lower role functioning scores at six weeks 
and at six months, and significantly lower rates of satisfaction with their treatment, their attending 
physician, and their overall access to care at six weeks.  However, at the six month interview, 
statistically significant lower rates of satisfaction were found only with regard to overall access to 
care.  At six weeks and at six months workers in the managed care group reported less progress on 
recovery and the difference was statistically significant.  However, at six months the study found  
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no differences in the two groups with regard to pain, mental health status, or physical functioning.  
This study points to the multiplicity of outcomes that warrant attention in studies of provider 
choice. 
What can we conclude from this review?  First, while most studies appear to conclude that 
employer choice is associated with lower medical payments, the findings are not unchallenged.  
This should hardly be surprising, as the states and the years selected have varied, and the measures 
of choice have tended to be crude.  Additionally, very little work in relation to choice of provider 
has focused on outcomes or cost measures other than medical payments – such as duration of time 
out of work, indemnity benefits, physical recovery, and worker satisfaction with care.  And rarely 
have many other factors that likely affect outcomes such as worker and employer characteristics 
been controlled for in these studies.  Further, no study appears to have considered and analyzed the 
significance of whether the injured employee had been treated previously by the provider who 
gave primary care in the workers’ compensation claim.  Finally, studies done even a few years 
earlier were done when network arrangements were less common.  Since employer-selected 
providers are more likely to participate in such plans now than they did previously, the relevance 
of some of those earlier studies may have diminished. 
This literature review is helpful in highlighting the potential strengths of the present study.  
First, we utilize data that are taken from employee interviews that asked workers to identify who 
selected the health care provider.  This is critical, since studies by Lewis (1992), Barth and Victor 
(2003), and Victor, et al. (2003) have shown that there are many instances where employees 
actually choose the provider in employer choice states, and where the employer selects the 
provider in states categorized as employee choice.
3  Analyzing the outcomes of cases on the basis 
of who actually chose the provider, and not simply whether there was an employee or employer 
choice state law, is more informative about the impact of provider choice.  Second, we linked the  
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interview data to claims data supplied by the claims payors, providing information on factors such 
as medical and indemnity costs, medical treatments, employer attributes, etc.  A more complete 
picture of the claim from the vantage of both the worker and the employer should help to better 
establish the consequences of provider choice.  And third, a potentially important and unique 
feature of this study is that the interview also indicated whether the primary provider had 
previously treated the worker for an unrelated condition.  We suspected that a previous provider-
patient relationship might affect some of the outcomes that we measured – and as noted above, 
recent state-level policy changes recognize this difference – and the data therefore allow us to test 
this hypothesis.   
III. Data and Descriptive Information 
Data Source and Variable Descriptions 
One key data source used in this paper is the WCRI Detailed Benchmark/Evaluation 
(DBE) database, which contains over 16 million workers’ compensation claims with 
representative data in at least a dozen large states.  These data come from claims payors – insurers 
and self-insured employers.  We extracted information about the worker, employer, injury, and 
costs of each case in the study from the WCRI DBE database.  The second key data source comes 
from telephone interviews conducted on behalf of WCRI by the Center for Survey Research and 
Analysis at the University of Connecticut as part of a study to compare worker outcomes in 
California, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Texas, for a subset of cases drawn from the WCRI 
DBE database.  Approximately 750 interviews were completed in 2002 and 2003 in each state 
with workers who had experienced more than seven days of lost time from work, approximately 
3.5 years after the injuries.
4  The telephone interviews supplement the claims data with 
information on choice of provider, as well as satisfaction with health care, worker and employer 
characteristics, return to work, and self-reported information on health status from which we  
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derive measures of severity of injury and recovery of physical health.  Victor, et al. (2003) fully 
describe the data, the survey, response rates, and representativeness. 
Table 1 lists the key variables used in the present study, including the dependent variables 
for our analyses, the characterization of provider choice, and injury and treatment characteristics.  
Other variables used as controls in our regression models are noted later; most are quite standard.
5  
Some of these variables merit discussion.   
Provider Choice 
To classify workers by choice of provider, we first need to identify the primary provider.  
Some workers received care at the workplace, in an ambulance, or at a hospital emergency room.  
Because provider choice is not an issue in these cases, these workers were excluded from the study 
unless they received subsequent treatment from a provider outside of the work place or emergency 
room.  In contrast, we included those who received initial treatment at a medical doctor’s or 
chiropractor’s office, clinic, hospital, etc.  The central focus of this study is on the choice of the 
primary provider – according to the worker, the one that made the decisions about the care that the 
worker needed and either provided that care or directed the worker to someone who could provide 
it.  The respondents were asked about the number of providers who treated them.  Where there 
was only a single, non-emergency provider (about 20 percent of cases), the initial provider was 
necessarily the primary provider.  The remainder of workers received care from more than one 
provider.  For these workers, the primary provider was also the worker’s initial provider in about 
60 percent of cases, according to the worker, and was a different provider in about 40 percent of 
cases.
6   
Next, focusing on the primary provider, if the worker said that the provider was selected by 
self, a family member or friend, or the worker’s attorney, we regarded this as “employee choice.”
7  
If the worker said that the provider was selected by the employer or insurer, we categorized this as  
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“employer choice.”  If a medical center, medical provider, or “someone else” was seen by the 
worker to have chosen the provider, we excluded the case from this study because it was 
ambiguous whether the worker or employer selected the referring medical center or medical 
provider.  The distributions of these choices for the four states combined and each state separately 
are displayed in Table 2.
8   
The numbers in Table 2 indicate that employee choice was more prevalent in Texas and 
Massachusetts.  This is sensible because in these two states the law in effect at the time of the 
study gave the worker the choice of initial provider and relatively free reign to change providers, 
whereas in California and Pennsylvania the law allowed the employer to designate the provider for 
the first 30 days and 90 days respectively, after which the worker could change providers.
9  But as 
noted earlier, the policy “regime” does not fully determine choice, as there are many cases in 
Texas and Massachusetts where employers chose the provider, and conversely many cases in 
California and Pennsylvania where the employee chose.  Table 2 also shows the sample size 
available for the empirical analysis, namely the 1,960 cases classified as either employee or 
employer choice. 
When workers chose the primary provider, we also asked if the provider had previously 
treated the worker for a different condition.  If so, the provider was defined as a prior provider, 
and if the provider had not previously treated the worker for a different condition, we labeled that 
provider as a new provider.  This breakdown is also shown in Table 2.
10  Among those cases 
where the workers chose the primary provider, they selected a prior provider about half of the time 
in California, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, but only about one-third of the time in Texas.  We 
suspect that the difference for Texas arises because injured workers who are not covered by health 
insurance are less likely to have established relationships with health care providers.  We do not 
know from our survey whether injured workers had health insurance coverage, but the population  
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in Texas is much less likely to have health insurance coverage than are persons in the other three 
states.
11  Finally, although not central to our analysis, we note that regardless of who chose the 
provider, for the vast majority of workers (over 85 percent in each state) a physician was their 
primary provider, with chiropractors as the next most common type of provider. 
Cost and Outcome Measures 
We study most of the key outcomes of workplace injuries that should be of interest to 
policymakers: costs, return to work, and recovery of physical health, as well as satisfaction with 
care.   The two cost measures that we study are indemnity benefits and medical payments per 
claim.  Both measures are derived from payors’ records about what payments were actually made 
as of 29 to 31 months after the injury.  The WCRI DBE database standardizes definitions of these 
measures across payors and across states.  The first two rows of Table 3 show average indemnity 
benefit payments and medical payments per claim for each state.   
We also study whether the worker returned to work for at least one continuous month at 
any time between the injury and the interview, which we call a “substantial return to work.”  In 
addition, we measure the duration of time out of work, as reported by the worker as of the date of 
interview – approximately 3 to 3.5 years post-injury.  Recall that all cases sampled had more than 
seven days of lost time.  The third and fourth rows of Table 3 show the percent who did not report 
a substantial return to work, and the mean and median durations of time out of work. 
An important outcome is the extent to which the worker recovered his or her physical 
health after the injury.  The measure used is derived from worker responses to the SF-12
® survey – 
which, along with the longer SF-36
®, is the most widely-used instrument for measuring general 
health status.  In the interview, we asked workers to recall their health status at three points in time 
– the month prior to the injury, the week after the injury, and the month prior to the interview.  
The recovery variable is the difference between the worker’s self-reported health status after the  
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injury and the same measure at the time of interview.
12  Because this measure is based on workers’ 
perceptions, we often refer to this variable as “perceived recovery.”
13  The focus is on physical 
health, not mental health.  Because the SF-12
® scores for physical health are quite insensitive to 
even extreme variations in the mental health scores, we compute the physical health scores 
holding the mental health scores constant.
14  The fifth row of Table 3 shows the means for the 
recovery measure; health status is coded on a scale of 0 to 100. 
Our final outcome variable is overall satisfaction with care.  The variable used in this study 
is based on the specific question “Now think about all of the medical care you received from the 
first treatment for your injury until now.  Were you satisfied or dissatisfied with the medical care 
you received overall?”  The final four rows of Table 3 show the distribution of responses. 




The analysis is based on a standard regression-type model for a cost or outcome variable 
generically denoted Yis, where ‘i’ indexes individuals and ‘s’ states, of the form: 
 
(1)  Yis = ￿ + CHOICEis￿ + WORKERis￿ + FIRMis￿ + INJURYis￿ + STATEs￿  
+ TREATMENTis￿ + ￿is. 
 
Our dependent variables come in different forms – continuous (for example, the cost 
measures), dichotomous (for example, substantial return to work), and polytomous (satisfaction) – 
necessitating different statistical methods, as discussed below.  The provider choice variables, 
which may be one dummy variable corresponding to the two-way classification, or two dummy 
variables corresponding to the three-way classification, are included in the vector CHOICE.  In 
any model of workers’ compensation costs or outcomes, it is essential to include characteristics of 
workers (WORKER) and the workplace (FIRM), as both have been shown to affect costs or 
outcomes.  For example, older workers have been found to be less likely to return to work;  
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workers with less education may have greater difficulty in the labor market; and workers in some 
industries (such as construction) may have unique return-to-work problems (for example, Galizzi 
and Boden, 1996).  The list of variables included in WORKER includes demographics, education, 
wages and whether the individual was an hourly worker, tenure at the time of injury, and whether 
the worker elected to have the interview conducted in Spanish.  Workplace characteristics include 
firm size and the industry/occupation breakdown discussed earlier. 
We would expect costs, return to work, recovery, and satisfaction to depend in important 
ways on the characteristics of the injury, of which we have alternative measures.  The first is a 
classification of injury type, based on the diagnostic (ICD-9) codes assigned by the providers, 
including: back pain; non-back sprain or strain; fracture; inflammation, laceration, or contusion; 
and a residual category of other injuries.
15  A second measure captures the worker’s perceived 
injury severity.  This measure is constructed from the worker’s answers to the SF-12
® instrument, 
paralleling what we did for the measures of perceived recovery (as discussed earlier).   
The inclusion of the worker, workplace, and injury characteristics in a model of how 
provider choice affects outcomes is unambiguous, as these variables may be associated with both 
provider choice and the costs and outcomes we study, but not for reasons underlying causal 
relationships between provider choice and outcomes.  For example, older males may have worse 
medical outcomes because age inhibits recovery.  Yet older males may also – because of greater 
affluence, access to health insurance, and possibly even previous injuries – be most likely to have 
chosen a primary provider whom they have seen previously.  In this case, without controlling for 
age and sex we might incorrectly infer that choice of a prior provider resulted in or caused worse 
medical outcomes.  Similarly, more severe injuries may make it more likely, at least in some 
states, that the employee chose the provider; for example, in California, during the sample period  
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we use, the employee had the right to choose a physician 30 days after first receiving treatment, 
and more severe injuries are more likely to pass the 30-day window. 
Finally, as noted earlier our data come from four states – Texas, Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, and California – across which workers’ compensation systems vary.  As examples, 
these states differ on matters such as the frequency and sources of disputes, the methods used to 
terminate temporary disability benefits, the criteria used to rate permanent disability benefits, the 
use of networks to provide medical care, and so on.  Given these facts, if we use across-state 
variation in choice and outcomes to identify ￿ in equation (1), we may incorrectly attribute 
differences in outcomes associated with other features of states’ workers’ compensation systems to 
variation in individual choice of provider.  Consequently, we report all specifications including 
dummy variables for the states (STATE), in which case the effects of provider choice are 
identified solely from within-state differences associated with this choice.  The potential downside 
of this is that we effectively throw out the variation in provider choice that is driven by differences 
in state workers’ compensation systems, which is plausibly the most exogenous source of 
variation in provider choice.  We examined estimates both excluding and including the state 
dummy variables, to see whether we find results that are robust to this specification choice and 
therefore can draw firmer conclusions.  In general, we found that results including or excluding 
the state dummy variables were similar.
 16  Because we think it most important to control for 
omitted variation in state workers’ compensation systems, we report and focus on estimates based 
on specifications including the state dummy variables.
17 
Statistical Models for Different Types of Dependent Variables 
 
For the three cost and outcome variables that are continuous (indemnity benefits, medical 
payments, and recovery of physical health), equation (1) is estimated as a linear regression.  We  
14 
transform the estimated coefficients to report the results in terms of the implied percentage change 
in the dependent variable.   
The return-to-work outcome is dichotomous, and we estimate a logit model, assuming that 
the cumulative distribution for ￿is is the logistic.  Using Zis￿ as a short-hand for the parameters and 
variables in equation (1), the logit model implies that the odds ratio is  
(2)  P(Yis = 1)/P(Yis = 0) = exp(Zis￿), 
 
which in turn implies that exp(￿k) – where ￿k is the coefficient on a particular variable Z
k in Z – 
measures the multiplicative effect on the relative probability P(Yis = 1)/P(Yis = 0) of a one-unit 
increase in Z
k.  We report the implied percentage change in the odds ratio associated with each Z
k. 
The model for the duration of time out of work is estimated using survival methods, to 
account for the possible truncation of the spell of time out of work.  In this framework, the 
outcome measure is Tis, the length of the spell of time out of work.  We estimate an accelerated 
failure time model, in which 
(3)  Tis = exp(Zis￿ + ￿￿is). 
 
As is common in these models, we fix the variance of ￿ at one, and allow ￿ to be a 
parameter that is estimated.  In this setting, we build the likelihood function for two types of 
observations.  For the uncensored observations, we have an expression for the probability of 
observing a spell of length Tis, or f(Tis).  For the censored observations, all we know is that the 
spell of time out of work lasts at least as long as tis.  The probability of this event is one minus the 
cumulative distribution function for tis, or the survivor function for tis, which we denote S(tis).  The 
density and survival function are related through the hazard function h(tis) = f(tis)/S(tis).  All that 
remains is to specify a distribution for ￿ in equation (3).  We assume a logistic distribution for ￿ (a 
log-logistic distribution for Tis), in which case the survivor function is 
(4)  S(tis) = 1/[1+ {exp(−Zis￿)tis}
1/￿].
18    
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A nice feature of the log-logistic distribution is that an expression very similar to that for 
the logit model results, specifically 
(5)  S(tis)/{1- S(tis)} = exp[Zis(￿/￿) − (1/￿)ln(tis)], 
 
which implies that exp(￿k/￿), computed from the coefficient on a particular variable Z
k in Z, 
measures the effect of a one-unit increase in Z
k on the ratio of the probabilities of the spell lasting 
at least as long as any time t.
19  This parallels the earlier interpretations of the parameters for the 
logit and multinomial logit models.  However, it is also the case that exp(￿k/￿) equals the ratio of 
the expected duration when the corresponding variable Z
k is one unit higher to when it is not, and 
therefore 100￿(exp(￿k/￿) − 1) measures the percentage by which the expected duration is longer 
with this change in Z
k.  We report these percentages in the table.
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Finally, the satisfaction outcome is also discrete, but takes on four ordered values: very 
satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, and very dissatisfied.  To study this outcome, 
an ordered discrete choice model is used.  In this model, Y
*
is denotes the unobserved continuous 
measure of satisfaction, which follows the model Y
*
is = Zis￿ + ￿is.  The individual responds with 
the lowest category, Yis = 1, if Y
*
is < ￿1, the next category, Yis = 2, if ￿1 ￿ Y
*
is < ￿2, etc., and the 
highest category, Yis = 4, if ￿3 ￿ Y
*
is, with ￿1 < ￿2 < ￿3 (the ￿’s are unknown parameters to be 
estimated).  Assuming again that the cumulative distribution function of ￿ is logistic, then the 
probability of each of these outcomes can clearly be written as a function of the same expressions 
used in the logit model.  For example, we have 
(6)  P(Yis = 1) = P(Y
*




(7)   P(Yis = 2) = P(Y
*
is < ￿2) − P(Y
*
is < ￿1) = {1/[1 + exp(Zis￿ − ￿2)]} 
                  − {1/[1 + exp(Zis￿ − ￿1)]}. 
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In this way the probability of each response can be written, and the likelihood function 
constructed.  Note that in this case the relative probability of the response being in any category 
j+1 or higher relative to j is 
(8)  P(Yis ￿ j+1))/P(Yis = j) = exp(Zis￿ − ￿j), 
 
so that, paralleling the logit model, exp(￿k) measures the effect of a one-unit increase in Z
k on the 
log of the relative probability P(Yis ￿ j+1))/P(Yis = j), or the relative probability of reporting a 
higher level of satisfaction.  We report these effects as the implied percentage change in the 
likelihood of reporting a higher level of satisfaction.   
Equality of Effects of Provider Choice Across States 
 
One issue is whether we can combine or “pool” the data across the four states to obtain the 
most precise estimates of the impact of provider choice.  Given that we have only about 400-550 
observations per state, this pooling is highly desirable.  But it could be inappropriate and lead to 
biased estimates if the effects of provider choice on the outcomes we study vary significantly 
across states.  We tested for this and did not find evidence against the restrictions implied in 
combining the data and estimating a common set of effects of provider choice.  Specifically, for 
each analysis we conduct we also tested for differences in the parameters describing the effects of 
provider choice, as well as the coefficients of the other variables in the model.  We did this by 
interacting each of these variables with the state dummy variables, estimating these full models, 
and then separately testing the constraints that the provider choice coefficients were the same 
across states, and that the other coefficients were the same across states.  We never rejected the 
first set of restrictions; we sometimes rejected the latter, but verified that the provider choice 
estimates were insensitive to allowing the effects of the other control variables to differ across 
states.
21  We therefore report pooled estimates in the tables that follow. 
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Causal Inferences Regarding Provider Choice 
 
Because workers are not randomly assigned to provider choice categories, we have to be 
cautious in drawing causal inferences about the effects of provider choice, which would in turn 
potentially be informative about the effects of policy changes regarding provider choice.  In 
particular, we have to be concerned that there are characteristics of workers associated with both 
provider choice and with workers’ compensation outcomes that could result in misleading 
inferences about the effects of provider choice.  As one concrete example, suppose that the most 
severe injuries tend to result in workers ending up with a new provider, chosen by them, as their 
primary provider.  This might occur because in search of recoveries from the most severe injuries 
workers are motivated to seek out particular providers (such as specialists), who they subsequently 
report as their primary provider.  In this scenario, comparisons of outcomes such as costs and time 
away from work between these workers and workers for whom the employer chose the provider 
would tend to indicate that for the former group costs were higher and return-to-work outcomes 
worse.  We might then be led to the incorrect conclusion that worker choice of a new provider 
causes higher costs and worse return to work, when instead the relationship arises only because 
the most severely injured workers selected into the employee choice/new provider group. 
We address this potential problem in a few ways.  Most important, the rich data we have 
enable us to include controls for numerous detailed characteristics of workers, workplace 
characteristics, and injury characteristics, including injury severity.  Indeed, we would argue that 
the data used in this report yield far more detailed sets of control variables than are available in 
data used in past research.  
Second, in Table 4 we report estimates of models for provider choice, to explore which 
variables are in fact associated with choice.  We report odds ratios for the employee choice options 
relative to employer choice.  A coefficient estimate greater than one, when statistically  
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significantly different from one, implies that the variable associated with that coefficient boosts 
the likelihood of employee choice.  We do not show the estimated coefficients for all of the 
variables, but only for those related to the injury (type, severity, treatment, and attorney 
involvement).  It turns out that quite a few variables are significantly related to provider choice – 
which would not be the case with random assignment of choice.  Most significantly, certain types 
of injuries, especially back injuries, are significantly more likely to be associated with employee 
choice of provider than is the reference category of inflammation, laceration, or contusion.  On the 
other hand, perceived severity is not associated with a higher likelihood of employee choice of 
provider, although because the model includes such variables as type of injury, what is captured 
by the estimated coefficient of severity is the association of severity with provider choice for the 
same type of injury.  Note also that major surgery is significantly positively associated with 
employee choice, although as discussed more below, surgery could be more of an outcome of 
employee choice rather than a measure of seriousness of the injury. 
The estimates in Table 4 certainly indicate that the assignment of workers and their injuries 
to provider choice regimes is not random, which is no surprise.  What the estimates cannot tell us, 
however, is whether the inclusion of the control variables listed in Table 4 in our models for 
workers’ compensation costs and outcomes capture enough of the variation in other determinants 
of these costs and outcomes that we are confident that the regression models capture the causal 
effects of provider choice, or instead whether there is still residual unmeasured variation in 
severity of injury or other factors that is related to provider choice.  However, the fact that greater 
severity is not independently associated with a higher likelihood of employee choice makes it 
more plausible that we are estimating causal effects of provider choice. 
Our third approach to obtaining estimates that provide evidence on the causal effects of 
provider choice involves including additional control variables related to severity.  In particular,  
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the claims database includes information on the treatment of the injury, including whether the 
treatment included an overnight hospitalization and major surgery; these are captured in the 
variable TREATMENT in equation (1) above.  These potential control variables present a double-
edged sword.  On the plus side, they are likely to capture additional variation in the severity of the 
injury that is not picked up in the other variables that capture nature and severity of injury.  For 
example, some fractures, even if viewed by the respondent as entailing the same severity, may 
result in overnight hospitalization for reasons related to the injury, and therefore we would expect 
higher medical payments.  On the minus side, the treatment variables may also reflect outcomes of 
the medical decision-making process, and hence to some extent directly reflect the choice of 
provider.  Because the treatment variables in part capture costs and outcomes, their inclusion may 
amount to “over-controlling” for injury severity.
22  That is, they may capture not only remaining 
differences in severity, but also outcomes of provider choice that we more appropriately want to 
think about as effects of provider choice, but will not capture when the treatment variables are 
included. 
Under this interpretation, excluding the treatment variables runs the risk of having 
unmeasured heterogeneity in injury severity, which if associated with provider choice may lead to 
choice-related differences in costs and outcomes that are too large, while including the treatment 
variables is likely to generate estimates that understate the differences associated with provider 
choice.  As a consequence, we present both sets of estimates to assess for which outcomes the 
resulting range of estimates is sufficiently tight to be informative about the effects of provider 
choice.  And where the estimates differ, readers more concerned that our injury and severity 
measures leave potentially important differences in severity unmeasured may be more inclined to 
emphasize the estimates including the treatment variables, and vice versa.  
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Finally, a fourth approach we take to the problem of unmeasured severity is to assess how 
sensitive the estimates are to omitting from the model variables measuring severity or the nature of 
the injury.  If the estimates are not very sensitive, this suggests that additional unmeasured 
variation in severity when these variables are included cannot play much of a role. 
Of course, even with all of these efforts, we cannot definitively rule out the possibility that 
even with the treatment variables included, there is unmeasured variation in injury severity that 
may affect, for example, costs or return to work.  The implication of this is that, ultimately, we 
cannot arrive at an absolutely definitive answer regarding the causal effects of provider choice 
from these data, because, at its core, this is a question about differences between workers that we 
cannot measure, in contrast to those we can measure.  But in our view, the extensive set of control 
variables that we have, coupled with the findings from the various analyses just described that 
tend to reinforce the results, make us reasonably confident that we are identifying causal effects of 
provider choice.  This means that it is appropriate to think of our estimates as indicating what 
would happen if policies regarding provider choice were changed, for example, to restrict 
employee choice.  We believe this is particularly true of the specifications that we regard as likely 
over-controlling for injury characteristics by including the hospitalization and surgery variables.  
At the same time, we recognize that our evidence falls short of experimental standards, which of 
course leaves open the possibility that experimental evidence could lead to different conclusions. 
V. Provider Choice and Workers’ Compensation Outcomes  
 
Employee versus Employer Choice 
 
We begin by following the literature and looking at the most common way of 
characterizing provider choice – employee choice compared to employer choice.  The results are 
reported in Table 5, for each of the six dependent variables we study.  In each case, we first report 
the results for the model that may under-control for severity by excluding the treatment variables  
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(“Model 1”), and then for the model that likely over-controls for severity by including them 
(“Model 2”).    
As shown in Table 5, when employees chose the primary provider, medical payments were 
10-21 percent higher.  Not surprisingly, the estimated differential is higher for the specification 
excluding the treatment variables, but the estimate is statistically significant at the 10-percent level 
(or better) in both cases.
23  The results for indemnity costs also suggest higher costs when workers 
choose the provider, although in this case the evidence is weaker.  In particular, the estimates from 
the model excluding the hospitalization and surgery controls indicate that indemnity benefits were 
15 percent higher when workers chose the provider, while the difference falls by nearly half and 
becomes statistically insignificant when these treatment variables are included.   
The results for the next two dependent variables – duration of time away from work and an 
indicator of substantial return to work – consistently indicate that employee choice of provider is 
associated with slower return to work.  Reported time from injury until initial substantial return to 
employment was 23-32 percent longer where the employee chose, and the results are statistically 
significant at the 5-percent level for both specifications.  Substantial return to work was 16-19 
percent less likely in the three years after the injury when the employee chose; the estimates are 
similar with or without the treatment controls, although only marginally significant.  For the 
return-to-work outcomes the range of estimates for models 1 and 2 is relatively tight, and the 
statistical significance of the results is no weaker including the hospitalization and surgery 
controls, bolstering our confidence in these results and in a causal interpretation of the effect of 
provider choice. 
Interestingly, despite the differences in costs and time out of work, there was no difference 
in the perceived recovery of physical health between workers who selected the provider and 
workers where the employer selected the provider, as any estimated differences in recovery are  
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trivially small (0 to 1 percent) and not statistically significant.  On the other hand, we find that 
workers who chose their providers were much more likely to be more satisfied with their overall 
medical care, with nearly 60 percent higher odds of reporting a higher level of satisfaction, for 
both specifications.  These last two findings may appear to be contradictory.  Below, we discuss 
possible reasons why we find higher levels of satisfaction with health care where workers select 
the provider despite no difference in perceived recovery, and attempt to untangle the question of 
whether the higher satisfaction reflects other dimensions of the quality of medical care. 
Employee Choice of Prior Provider, Employee Choice of New Provider, and Employer Choice 
We next turn to the three-way classification of provider choice that distinguishes between 
employee choice cases where the worker selected as primary provider a “prior provider” – 
someone who treated the person prior to the injury for an unrelated condition – and cases where 
the worker selected as primary provider a “new provider” – someone who had not previously 
treated the worker.  Both are compared to employer choice cases, and to each other.  As noted 
earlier, these results are informative regarding implications of recent public policy changes, such 
as California’s recent workers’ compensation reforms (SB 899, passed in April, 2004) that restrict 
workers’ ability to choose a new provider. 
The results are reported in Table 6.  We begin with the estimates in the first row, which 
measure differences in outcomes for employee choice of a prior provider relative to employer 
choice.  With regard to medical benefits, we find that when the employee chose a prior provider, 
payments were significantly higher when the treatment variables are excluded (22 percent), but 
that the estimate falls by two-thirds and becomes statistically insignificant when the treatment 
controls are included.  The estimated differences in indemnity benefits are small and statistically 
insignificant in either case.    
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The next two specifications examine the two return-to-work outcomes.  Here, paralleling 
the evidence for medical and indemnity benefits, there is no consistent evidence of differences 
between employee choice of a prior provider and employer choice, especially when the treatment 
controls are included.  When we look at differences in physical recovery, we again find no 
difference associated with this particular form of employee choice.  But we find considerably 
higher satisfaction – on the order of 90 percent.   
The results are substantively different when we look at the differences in outcomes 
associated with employee choice of a new provider versus employer choice, as reported in the 
second row of Table 6.  The estimates for medical benefits indicate that these payments were 12-
20 percent higher when the employee chose a new provider, with both estimates statistically 
significant at the 10-percent level (or better) whether or not the treatment variables are included.  
Indemnity benefits are also estimated to be higher – by 15-20 percent – when employees choose a 
new provider, although the smaller estimate when the treatment variables are included is only 
marginally significant.   
With respect to return to work, the evidence consistently indicates a lower rate of any 
substantial return to work and longer durations of time out of work when employees chose a new 
provider.  The estimates indicate that durations were 40-48 percent longer, and that the likelihood 
of a substantial return to work was 28 percent lower, and all of these differences are statistically 
significant at the 5-percent level.  In contrast to these differences in the findings when the 
employee chose a new provider, we again find no difference in physical recovery associated with 
this type of employee choice, but we still find higher satisfaction with the health care received.  As 
noted earlier, we return, below, to the issue of interpreting the higher satisfaction with medical 
care in light of no evidence of differences in perceived physical recovery.   
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The results discussed thus far suggest that the findings in Table 5 regarding higher costs 
and worse return to work associated with employee choice overall are driven, in large part, by 
employee choice of a new provider.  That is, there are potentially important differences in the 
costs and outcomes of cases where the worker selected a prior provider compared with selecting a 
new provider.  The third row of Table 6 provides more evidence on the differences between the 
effects of employee choice of a prior versus a new provider.  Specifically, it shows the differences 
in costs and outcomes between when the worker selects a prior versus a new primary provider – 
reporting the impact of the employee choosing a new provider compared to the employee choosing 
a prior provider – and indicates which differences are statistically significant.
24  This is important 
because if the differences associated with the two types of employee choice are not significantly 
different from each other, then arguably our best estimates come from the simpler models covered 
in Table 5 that do not distinguish by type of employee choice. 
The estimates indicate that the sharpest differences between the two types of employee 
choice are for return to work.  Employee choice of a new provider is associated with significantly 
poorer return-to-work outcomes, with the odds of having a substantial return to work 26-30 
percent lower, and the duration of time out of work 26-30 percent longer; all of these are 
significant at the 10-percent level, and three of the four at the 5-percent level.  There is little 
difference in medical payments, but indemnity benefits are 11-16 percent higher when the 
employee selects a new provider.  The latter difference is at best weakly statistically significant, 
but at least the point estimate is in the direction we would expect given the worse return to work 
associated with employee choice of a new provider.  Finally, satisfaction is lower when the worker 
selects a new provider compared to a prior provider, yet as we have found throughout, choice is 
unrelated to physical recovery.  
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Finally, as discussed earlier, there is a question whether the estimates just presented reflect 
only provider choice, or instead also reflect unmeasured residual variation in injury severity that is 
associated with provider choice.  We noted that, especially in the models that control for 
treatment, we are more confident that the estimates reflect causal effects of provider choice.  
However, as a way of shedding more light on this question, Table 7 reports results in which, in a 
sense, we go in the opposite direction to what we did when we added the treatment variables.  In 
particular, we instead begin with the model 1 estimates, and then successively drop the perceived 
severity variable, and then drop the “type of injury” variables as well.  If unmeasured injury 
severity accounted for large shares of the apparent effects of provider choice on workers’ 
compensation outcomes, then when we drop the perceived severity measure the effects of provider 
choice should appear even larger.   
However, as indicated in the third and fourth rows (the first two rows repeat the findings 
for model 1 from Table 6), the estimated effects of employee choice of either a prior or a new 
provider, relative to employer choice, scarcely change upon omitting the perceived severity 
variable, casting doubt on an important role for unmeasured severity.  Taking this one step further, 
in the last two rows of the table we even drop the injury type variables, which surely capture 
information on the nature and seriousness of the injury.  Here, especially for choice of a new 
provider, the estimated effects on costs and return to work grow (in absolute value), but only 
slightly.  In our view the modest changes that ensue when we drop measures related to injury 
severity indicate that it is unlikely that unmeasured injury severity materially distorts the estimated 
effects of provider choice that we find, bolstering a causal interpretation of our findings.





VI. Employee Choice and Worker Satisfaction with Health Care 
Why Might Satisfaction Appear Higher but Perceived Physical Recovery No Better with 
Employee Choice?  
One consistent finding thus far is that worker satisfaction with the overall health care they 
received was higher when the worker chose the primary provider (and more so for the choice of a 
prior provider), despite the evidence that employee choice is not associated with better physical 
recovery as reported by the worker.  In this subsection we explore alternative explanations of this 
finding.  Specifically, we examine three conjectures.     
Better care.  One conjecture is that the higher satisfaction with employee-selected 
providers actually reflects independent information about better medical outcomes beyond what is 
captured by the physical recovery measure.  One possibility is that employee-selected providers 
achieve better physical recoveries for their patients, presumably in ways not captured in the 
physical recovery measure we use, and as a result the higher satisfaction associated with employee 
choice does reflect better medical outcomes.  Alternatively, employer-selected providers may tend 
to rush workers back to work prematurely, presumably in part because their interests are more 
closely aligned with those of employers.  The likely mechanism in this case would be that physical 
recovery from the injury is as good when employers choose the provider, but being rushed back to 
work leads to more difficulties subsequently and hence lower satisfaction.  This conjecture is 
significant from a policy perspective because, if true, it would suggest that direct costs associated 
with employee choice are higher, but – in contrast to the implications of the results based on 
physical recovery – medical outcomes are also better.  In such a case employee choice would offer 
some real, tangible benefits as well as higher costs, making it difficult to assess policies that 
restrict employee choice.  
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Patient advocacy.  A second conjecture is that employee-selected providers help workers 
engage in behavior that unnecessarily extends time away from work.  Specifically, after an injury 
some workers may prefer not to go back to work, or may prefer to delay their return to work 
beyond the time that they may be physically able to return.  Such preferences on the part of 
workers would be perfectly consistent with the typical assumption in economic models that there 
is some disutility from work, so that for some workers staying away from work and collecting 
indemnity benefits – even if lower than what they would earn on the job – is preferable.  Worker-
selected providers, again because their interests are less aligned with those of employers, may be 
more willing to support workers’ efforts to delay returning to work, and as a consequence workers 
might be more satisfied with such care even if physical recovery is no better.  This case would 
point in the opposite direction as regards policy, since under this interpretation policymakers 
would presumably put greater weight on the consequences of provider choice for physical 
recovery, and perhaps be justified in discounting the evidence of higher satisfaction associated 
with employee choice. 
Intangibles of medical care.  The final conjecture pertains to aspects of the medical care 
that may be important to workers, yet have little impact on physical recovery.  First, workers may 
have expectations about the processes of care (for example, speed of time to first visit, time spent 
with provider, or bedside manner), and employee-selected providers may be more likely to meet 
those expectations, regardless of physical recovery.  Second, there may be an “empowerment 
effect” experienced by some workers who select their own provider which, by itself, leads to 
higher levels of satisfaction regardless of physical recovery.  And finally, workers may suspect 
that employer-selected providers are more concerned with satisfying the needs of the employer 
than of the worker.  Such a suspicion could result in a lower degree of trust, and hence influence 
satisfaction with the treatment, even if recovery is not affected.   
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Evidence 
There are two variables in the data set, which have not been discussed so far, that can help 
explore the first two conjectures offered above.  The first concerns whether there was a second 
absence from work (for those who had a substantial return to work) attributable to the original 
injury; the second concerns the worker’s perception regarding whether he or she was sent back to 
work “too soon” (again, for those who had a substantial return to work).  Both of these variables 
could reflect variation in medical outcomes that could, in principle at least, vary independently of 
reported physical recovery.  In addition, the response regarding whether the worker was sent back 
to work too soon could be informative about the “patient-advocacy” conjecture, which would 
predict that employer-selected providers are more likely to return workers too soon, at least as 
perceived by the worker. 
To begin, we verify that workers’ expressed satisfaction with their medical care is 
associated with these two variables in the manner we would expect if the variables are to provide 
information about the first two conjectures explaining why employee choice of provider is 
associated with higher satisfaction.  As reported in Table 8, workers are considerably more likely 
to report higher satisfaction when there is no second absence associated with the injury than when 
there is.  In addition, workers express much higher satisfaction when, in their view, their return to 
work was at the right time, rather than too soon.  Thus, in principle, if these outcomes are to some 
extent independent of physical recovery, they could explain higher worker satisfaction.  The 
interpretation regarding return to work is ambiguous, however, as it could reflect better medical 
treatment, or cooperation of employee-selected providers in malfeasance. 
In Table 9, we turn to evidence on these two conjectures, by estimating models – 
paralleling those in Tables 5 and 6 – which measure the relationships between provider choice and 
both second absences and perceptions of the timing of return to work.  As seen in the first two  
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columns of Table 9, there is no statistical relationship between provider choice and a second 
absence.  Workers who chose the provider – in general, or whether prior or new – were equally 
likely to have a second absence as workers for whom the employer chose the provider.  This 
makes it unlikely that the large impact of employee choice on satisfaction is due to employer-
selected providers returning workers to work prematurely, leading to these workers suffering a 
second absence.   
Similarly, the estimates in the third and fourth columns of Table 9 indicate that there is no 
relationship between provider choice and a perception of having returned to work too soon.  Most 
important, employee choice – in general, or whether of a prior or new provider – is not associated 
with a higher likelihood of having returned to work at the right time, versus too soon.  Thus, 
whether a more preferable timing of return to work, from the employee’s perspective, reflects 
better care or patient advocacy, the estimates provide no evidence to suggest that either one of 
these channels can explain the higher satisfaction workers express when they chose the provider.   
Overall, then, we find no evidence consistent with the conjecture that the higher 
satisfaction associated with employee choice of provider, coupled with no difference in physical 
recovery, is attributable to better medical care by employee-chosen providers along dimensions 
not captured by the physical recovery measure, or by patient advocacy in returning to work that is 
abetted by these providers.  We cannot, however, rule out conjectures associated with intangibles 
of medical care, related to factors such as the manner in which care was delivered, empowerment 
of the worker, or trust, rather than more objective medical outcomes.   
VII. Conclusions and Discussion 
 
Over the past several decades, public policy changes in workers’ compensation placed 
more restrictions on the ability of workers to choose their own medical provider.  For example, 
during the period of rising costs of the late 1980s and early 1990s, a number of states modified  
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“employee choice” laws to require that workers select providers from within approved networks of 
providers created by the employer.  And an important cost-containment provision of the 2004 
California workers’ compensation reforms was to require workers to select providers from 
employer-selected networks of providers, unless the workers predesignate a provider who 
previously treated them under a qualifying employer-sponsored group health plan.  In this paper, 
we provide estimates of the effects of provider choice on a variety of workers’ compensation 
outcomes, including medical and indemnity costs, return to work, physical recovery, and worker 
satisfaction with medical care.  Our study differs from previous work in terms of the richness of 
the data, the ability to look at outcomes beyond medical costs, our focus on the primary provider, 
and providing evidence not simply on employee versus employer choice, but also on the employee 
choice of prior versus new providers, which has some parallel to the most recent policy changes.   
The results can be summarized relatively succinctly.  When we look at the simple two-way 
classification of employee versus employer choice, we find evidence that costs are generally 
higher and return-to-work outcomes poorer when workers selected the provider, despite workers 
reporting similar recovery of physical health.  However, workers choosing their provider report 
higher satisfaction with overall care.  When we further subdivide employee choice into choice of 
new versus prior providers, we find that the adverse cost and return-to-work outcomes are largely 
associated with employee choice of new providers.  These findings suggest that public policies 
and private practices that encourage employer choice of provider may lower costs of workers’ 
compensation without adversely affecting recovery of health, but with reduced worker satisfaction 
with care.  Of course, these results are for cases “on average,” and any system needs monitoring to 
detect and deter cases in which employers take advantage of workers at the expense of their 
medical care or other workers’ compensation outcomes.   
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We are cognizant of the possibility that endogenous selection into different categories of 
provider choice could generate some of these findings.  However, the richness of the data with 
respect to capturing characteristics of injuries and their severity, and a number of sensitivity 
analyses, make us relatively confident that our findings by and large reflect causal effects of 
provider choice.   
We  also  explore  why  employee  choice  (overall,  and  of  new  or  prior  providers)  is  not 
associated with better medical outcomes as measured by workers’ perceived physical recovery, 
but is associated with higher worker satisfaction with medical care received.  We consider the 
possibility that higher satisfaction reflects better medical outcomes that are not reflected in the 
physical recovery measure, but by and large rule this out.  We also consider the possibility that 
higher satisfaction reflects employee-selected providers cooperating in some workers’ desires to 
stay out of work longer following a compensable injury, and rule this out as well.  We are left to 
conclude that the most likely explanation of the higher satisfaction with employee choice – despite 
no better physical recovery – reflects intangibles of medical care such as trust, empowerment, or 
simple manner of care delivery.  At the same time, we do not want to suggest that these intangible 
characteristics of medical care should necessarily be disregarded by policymakers weighing the 
costs and benefits of alternative laws regarding provider choice, especially if future research can 
draw  links  between  these  intangible  characteristics  of  medical  care and  improved 
medical outcomes. 
There are, naturally, some qualifications to these findings.  First, only four states are 
included in our sample, and a wider set of states could add information that reinforces the 
findings, or that is less consistent with them.  Second, the focus of this study has been on who 
actually chose the (primary) provider in specific cases, rather than the impact of the state legal 
provision about choice of initial provider or the laws about ongoing control of provider choice,  
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and we have shown that while state laws influence the actual choice, there is not a perfect 
correspondence.  At the same time, because state laws do influence the choice of provider, our 
results would be expected to correctly predict at least the sign of the effects of changes in state 
laws affecting provider choice, and to more accurately predict the effects of policies that more 
fully determine provider choice.  In addition, the reader is cautioned that the California and 
Pennsylvania laws and practices in effect during the sample period were not strong versions of 
employer choice laws – in both, the employer retained the right to select the provider for only a 
limited period of time, after which the worker could change providers.  One must therefore be 
careful about extrapolating from our findings to the impact of changing state laws about who 
controls the choice of provider.  And last, although we regard this study as an important addition 
to a relatively sparse empirical literature on a very important public policy issue, it is just one 
study.  Additional research on other states and using other data sources and approaches will be 
useful to see if these results are robust, if they are supported in other contexts, whether provider 
choice has different impacts in certain types of states but not in others, and how provider choice 
affects additional outcomes that we do not measure.   
Finally, it is useful to speculate as to the potential explanations of our findings that 
employee choice, and in particular employee choice of new providers, is associated with higher 
costs but no better physical recovery.  This speculation may prove useful in stimulating other 
research to try to better understand the precise mechanisms that drive the effects of provide choice.  
One possibility is that a provider selected by the employer may be more knowledgeable about 
working conditions and therefore might be better equipped to recommend sound return-to-work 
conditions.  In addition, many employers participate in medical network arrangements, which in 
many instances confers some screening of providers as well as fee discounts.  And when workers 
choose new providers, they may be operating in an environment where they have inadequate  
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information about provider quality and may also lack leverage to gain access to higher-quality 
providers.  Better-quality providers may not be taking new patients or may be scheduling with 
significant delays; in contrast, the employer or insurer (or network), through its purchasing power, 
may help the worker “jump the line” in cases where the employer chooses the provider.  In 
addition, a new provider may have less information about the worker, and hence engage in some 
unnecessary tests and procedures and practice more defensively.  We cannot say for sure, but these 
results are consistent with workers without pre-existing provider relationships being forced to 
participate in a search process with inadequate information about quality and inadequate leverage 
to gain access to better quality. 
These speculations, coupled with our results, suggest that employee choice, per se, does 
not increase costs of workers’ compensation.  Employer choice offers some advantages in terms of 
lower costs with similar recovery of physical health.  But employee choice of providers who had 
treated the worker previously offer similar advantages.  In contrast, the more problematic model of 
employee choice is choice of a new provider, which on average is associated with higher costs but 
no better recovery of physical health (although higher satisfaction with care than for employer 
choice) – plausibly due to informational disadvantages along a number of dimensions.  Together, 
these findings suggest that the policymakers may be able to find middle ground that moderates 
costs without sacrificing recovery of physical health by allowing workers to continue to treat with 
providers with whom they have a pre-existing relationship, but otherwise allowing the employer to 
select providers.  In states where the law gives the employer the choice of provider, this would 
increase worker choice.  In states where the law provides that workers may select providers, this 
would increase employer control of the choice.   
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Table 1:  Definitions of Variables 
Dependent variables: 
Indemnity benefits  The indemnity payment the worker received. 
Medical benefits  The amount the insurer paid for the worker's medical treatment. 
Substantial return to work  A dummy variable.  The value is 1 if the worker was able to return to work 
and stay for one full month. 
Duration of disability  The number of weeks from the time of the injury to the first substantial return 
to work.  If the workers did not have substantial return to work, we assigned 
156 weeks. 
Recovery  Worker's perceived recovery.  The difference between SF-12
® score in the 
week after the injury and the score at the time of the interview. 
Satisfaction  An ordinal categorical variable.  The question is about the satisfaction level 
with the medical care the worker received overall.  1 is "very satisfied." 2 is 
"somewhat satisfied." 3 is "somewhat dissatisfied." 4 is "very dissatisfied."  
Provider choice: 
Employer chose  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the employer or the insurance company 
chose the provider. 
Employee chose  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker, their family, their friends, or their 
attorney chose the provider. 
Employee chose, prior  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker, their family, their friends, or their 
attorney chose the provider, and the worker was previously treated by this 
provider for other medical condition. 
Employee chose, new  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker, their family, their friends, or their 
attorney chose the provider, and the worker was not previously treated by 
this provider for other medical condition. 
Injury characteristics: 
Back pain  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the type of injury is back pain. 
Non-back sprain or strain  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the type of injury is non-back sprain or strain. 
Fracture  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the type of injury is fracture. 
Inflammation, laceration, or 
contusion 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the type of injury is inflammation, laceration, 
or contusion. 
Other injuries  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the type of injury is other injury. 
Severity  Worker's perceived severity.  The difference between SF-12
® score during 
the four weeks before the injury and the score during the week after the 
injury. 
Treatment characteristics: 
Overnight hospitalization  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker received “room and board” or 
“intensive care” based on the revenue code. 
Major surgery  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the total payment for significant surgical 
services was positive.  
Table 2:  Choice of Primary Provider 
Percent of Workers  Combined  California  Texas  Massachusetts  Pennsylvania 
Employee chose  41.4  33.8  52.7  51.0  31.3 
You/respondent  36.9  28.4  46.8  46.3  29.4 
A family member  1.9  0.7  2.9  2.8  1.5 
A friend  1.3  1.6  2.0  1.4  0.2 
Your attorney  1.3  3.1  1.0  0.5  0.3 
Prior versus new: 
Prior  18.8    17.0  19.1  26.7  14.1 
New  22.6  16.8  33.6  24.3  17.2 
Employer chose  37.5  48.3  27.0  19.4  50.7 
Your employer  31.7  41.0  21.4  14.4  45.4 
An insurance company  5.8  7.3  5.6  5.0  5.3 
Medical professional/ 
hospital/clinic 
17.7  13.8  16.7  25.1  16.3 
Someone else  3.3  4.0  3.6  4.5  1.6 
Number of cases  2,513  665  609  542  697 
Number of cases with either 
employee or employer 
choice 
1,960  538  481  376  565 
Notes: In a handful of cases (10) respondents could not or did not answer the question about prior versus 
new provider.         
 
Table 3:  Costs and Health Outcomes 
  Combined  California  Texas  Massachusetts  Pennsylvania 
Costs: 
Average medical payment per 
claim 
$8,713  $9,950  $11,729  $4,946  $7,594 
Average indemnity benefit per 
claim 
$12,709  $15,444  $10,188  $13,874  $11,358 
Return to work: 
Percent of workers who did not 
have substantial return to work 
19  19  27  18  13 
Average/median duration of time 
out of work (weeks) 
44/10  45/12  57/15  43/12  32/8 
Recovery: 
Average recovery score  19.2  17.6  15.0  24.1  21.0 
Satisfaction with medical care: 
Percent very satisfied   52  47  51  56  57 
Percent somewhat satisfied  29  33  29  29  26 
Percent somewhat dissatisfied  8  10  9  6  8 
Percent very dissatisfied  10  10  11  8  9 
Notes: Only cases where the employee or employer chose the primary provider are included in this table and in 
subsequent tables.  The respondent’s SF-12
® scores are scaled scores from 0 to 100, where 100 is the 
best health.  The recovery score is the difference between the SF-12
® value at the time of interview and 
the score one week after injury.  The mean value of the preinjury scores for respondents was about 54 or 
55 depending on the state.  Only those who had substantial return to work are asked “how many weeks 
was it from the time you first stopped working because of your injury and the first time that you returned to 
work for one full month?”  For those who had not had a substantial return to work, the mean length of time 
from the injury to the interview is used (156 weeks).   
 
Table 4:  Determinants of Provider Choice, Pooled 
  Two-way Classification
  Three-way Classification
 
  Employee vs. Employer (odds 
ratio) 
Employee Prior vs. 
Employer (odds ratio) 
Employee New vs. 
Employer (odds ratio) 
Injury characteristics: 



















Inflammation, laceration, or 
contusion  … 
…  … 












Treatment characteristics:  


















N  1,960  1,951  1,951 
Notes: State dummy variables, and the full set of worker and workplace characteristics are included in both models.  
Worker characteristics include: age, sex, marital status, wages, whether an hourly worker, tenure, education (6 
categories), and whether the survey was conducted in Spanish (at the worker’s request).  Workplace 
characteristics include: firm size (4 categories), and occupation/industry group (7 categories).  Some claims 
have missing values for some of the independent variables, in which case we include dummy variables 
indicating missing data (and zeros for missing values).  Odds ratios from logit or multinomial logit model are 
shown, relative to employer choice.  Statistical significance is denoted as follows: ** 5-percent level; * 10-
percent level; and 
† 20-percent level. 
  
 
Table 5: Effects of Employee versus Employer Choice 
  Medical Benefits (%)  Indemnity Benefits (%)  Duration (%)  Substantial Return to 
Work (%) 
Recovery (%)  Satisfaction (%) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
Provider choice: 























































































































































Overnight hospitalization  …  148** 
(12.17) 
…  89** 
(5.69) 
…  140** 
(4.91) 
…  -56** 
(3.43) 
…  -18** 
(-2.94) 
…  1 
(0.06) 
Major surgery  …  118** 
(16.80) 
…  73** 
(8.10) 
…  73** 
(5.62) 
…  -18 
(1.26) 
…  -4 
(-1.16) 
…  -6 
(0.51) 
N  1,954  1,954  1,951  1,951  1,829  1,829  1,829  1,829  1,956  1,956  1,941  1,941 
Notes: For medical benefits, indemnity benefits, and recovery, we divide the coefficients by the average payments to get the percentage effect.  For duration, we take 
100×(e
coefficient  – 1) to get the percentage effect.  For the two benefit measures, we also show the dollar estimate.  For substantial return to work and for satisfaction, we 
take 100×(odds ratio – 1) to get the percentage effect.  In all cases, we show the t-statistic for the original coefficient estimate.  State dummy variables, and the full set of 
worker and workplace characteristics are included in both models.  Worker characteristics include: age, sex, marital status, wages, whether an hourly worker, tenure, 
education (6 categories), and whether the survey was conducted in Spanish (at the worker’s request).  Workplace characteristics include: firm size (4 categories), and 
occupation/industry group (7 categories).  Some claims have missing values for some of the independent variables, in which case we include dummy variables indicating 
missing data (and zeros for missing values).  Statistical significance is denoted as follows: ** 5-percent level; * 10-percent level; and 
† 20-percent level. 
  
Table 6: Effects of Employee Choice of Prior Provider and Employee Choice of New Provider versus Employer Choice 
  Medical Benefits (%)  Indemnity Benefits (%)  Duration (%)  Substantial Return to 
Work (%) 
Recovery (%)  Satisfaction (%) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
Provider choice: 



























Employee chose new 
provider 
20**  ($1,745) 
(2.48) 























Employee chose new 
provider – employee 


























































































































































…  145** 
(11.86) 
…  88** 
(5.60) 
…  138** 
(4.85) 
…  -56** 
(-3.42) 
…  -18** 
(-2.86) 
…  1 
(0.06) 
Major surgery  …  118** 
(16.77) 
…  73** 
(8.07) 
…  73** 
(5.59) 
…  -18 
(-1.27) 
…  -4 
(-1.11) 
…  -7 
(-0.66) 
N  1,945  1,945  1,942  1,942  1,820  1,820  1,820  1,820  1,947  1,947  1,932  1,932 
Notes: For medical benefits, indemnity benefits, and recovery, we divide the coefficients by the average payments to get the percentage effect.  For the two benefit measures, we also show the dollar 
estimate.  For duration, we take 100×(e
coefficient  – 1) to get the percentage effect.  For substantial return to work and for satisfaction, we take 100×(odds ratio – 1) to get the percentage effect.  In 
all cases, we show the t-statistic for the original coefficient estimate.  State dummy variables, and the full set of worker and workplace characteristics are included in both models.  Worker 
characteristics include: age, sex, marital status, wages, whether an hourly worker, tenure, education (6 categories), and whether the survey was conducted in Spanish (at the worker’s request).  
Workplace characteristics include: firm size (4 categories), and occupation/industry group (7 categories).  Some claims have missing values for some of the independent variables, in which case 
we include dummy variables indicating missing data (and zeros for missing values).  Statistical significance is denoted as follows: ** 5-percent level; * 10-percent level; and 
† 20-percent level.  
 
Table 7: Effects of Employee Choice of Prior Provider and Employee Choice of New Provider versus Employer Choice,  
Excluding Severity and Injury Measures 
  Medical Benefits (%)  Indemnity Benefits (%)  Duration (%)  Substantial Return  
to Work (%) 
Recovery (%)  Satisfaction (%) 
Model 1: Without treatment controls: 

























Omit severity variable: 
























Omit severity and injury variables: 

























Notes: See notes to Table 6.   
  
Table 8:  Satisfaction with Medical Care, Second Absences, and Return to Work 
  
 
Very Satisfied  
 




Very Dissatisfied  
Second absence due to injury: 
No second absence  60  28  6  6 
Second absence  35  32  14  19 
Workers’ perception of  
return to work: 
Right time   63  28  6  4 
Too soon   42  32  11  16 
Notes:  All entries are row percentages.    
Table 9:  Effects of Provider Choice on Completeness of Recovery/Perception of Return 
to Work, and Second Absences 
  Second Absence (%)  Perception of Return to Work Too Soon (%) 
  Two-way  Three-way  Two-way  Three-way 
Provider choice 
Employee chose  -1 
(0.05) 
…  7 
(0.56) 
… 
Employee chose prior 
provider 
…  20 
(0.99) 
…  4 
(0.28) 
Employee chose new 
provider 
…  -17 
(0.98) 
…  14 
(0.90) 
Injury controls 











































N  1361  1355  1357  1351 
Notes: We estimate logit models.  Positive estimates imply better outcomes – i.e., a lower probability of a 
second absence and a higher probability of return to work at the right time.  We take 100×(odds 
ratio – 1) to get the percentage effect.  In all cases, we show the t-statistic for the original 
coefficient estimate.  State dummy variables, and the full set of worker and workplace 
characteristics are included in both models.  Worker characteristics include: age, sex, marital 
status, wages, whether an hourly worker, tenure, education (6 categories), and whether the 
survey was conducted in Spanish (at the worker’s request).  Workplace characteristics include: 
firm size (4 categories), and occupation/industry group (7 categories).  The treatment variables 
are not included in these models.  Some claims have missing values for some of the 
independent variables, in which case we include dummy variables indicating missing data (and 
zeros for missing values).  Statistical significance is denoted as follows: ** 5-percent level; * 10-
percent level; and 
† 20-percent level.  
Appendix Table 1:  Effects of Employee versus Employer Choice, and Employee Choice of Prior Provider and Employee Choice of New Provider 
versus Employer Choice, Excluding State Dummy Variables 
  Medical Benefits (%)  Indemnity Benefits (%)  Duration (%)  Substantial Return to 
Work (%) 
Recovery (%)  Satisfaction (%) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
Two-way  

























N  1,954  1,954  1,951  1,951  1,829  1,829  1,829  1,829  1,956  1,956  1,941  1,941 
Three-way 






















































Employee chose new 
provider – employee 


























Treatment controls  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
N  1,945  1,945  1,942  1,942  1,820  1,820  1,820  1,820  1,947  1,947  1,932  1,932 
Notes: Specifications are comparable to those in Tables 5 and 6.  For medical benefits, indemnity benefits, and recovery, we divide the coefficients by the average payments 
to get the percentage effect.  For duration, we take 100×(e
coefficient  – 1) to get the percentage effect.  For the two benefit measures, we also show the dollar estimate.  
For substantial return to work and for satisfaction, we take 100×(odds ratio – 1) to get the percentage effect.  In all cases, we show the t-statistic for the original 
coefficient estimate.  State dummy variables, the full set of worker and workplace characteristics, and injury controls are included in both models.  Worker 
characteristics include: age, sex, marital status, wages, whether an hourly worker, tenure, education (6 categories), and whether the survey was conducted in Spanish 
(at the worker’s request).  Workplace characteristics include: firm size (4 categories), and occupation/industry group (7 categories).  Some claims have missing values 
for some of the independent variables, in which case we include dummy variables indicating missing data (and zeros for missing values).  Statistical significance is 
denoted as follows: ** 5-percent level; * 10-percent level; and 
† 20-percent level.  
Endnotes 
 
1 This is not to suggest that it is solely workers who have supported employee choice.  The 
organization of workers’ compensation state administrators – the International Association of 
Industrial Accident Boards and Commissions – at one time published a list of standards for the 
states wherein it endorsed the standard of worker choice.  However, the organization no longer 
publishes a listing of standards. 
2 For more details, see Neumark (2005). 
3 This can occur because the law only gives one party the right to choose the provider, which can 
be ceded to the other party. 
4 Note that these data were collected before the most recent reforms in California affecting 
employee choice.  
5 The one exception is a set of controls for industry/occupation cells categorized on the basis of 
risk, including high-risk services, low-risk services, clerical/professional occupations (regardless 
of industry), manufacturing, construction, trade, and other industries.  Further details are provided 
in Telles, et al. (2004, Technical Appendix). 
6 We recognize that the worker might have had many providers, but for the sake of clarity in 
interviewing and to keep the survey at a reasonable length, our questions related to those that the 
workers identified as the initial provider and the primary provider.  We also recognize that the 
number of types of specialties involved in treating injured individuals can be very large.  We 
chose not to probe this issue – other than to distinguish among physicians, chiropractors, and 
physical therapists.  One reason, again, was the length of the survey; a second was because the 
worker might not know a physician’s precise specialty. 
7 Classifying the choice of the provider as the employee’s choice if the worker’s attorney chose the 
physician strikes us as an accurate characterization of the choice.  It is important to emphasize that  
 
attorney involvement and attorney choice of provider are not the same thing.  There are plenty of 
cases where the employer chose the physician but there turned out to be attorney involvement 
(18.5 percent of employer choice cases, versus 24 percent of employee choice cases based on our 
classification). 
8 In each state, the data come from payors from three different market segments – the voluntary 
insurance market, the residual market (market of last resort) or the state fund, and the self-insured 
market.  In addition, claims were divided into two levels of financial seriousness, and the more 
serious claims were oversampled, because they are relatively rare.  Consequently, in all of our 
analyses weights are applied to data from each of the six strata in the state based on market 
segment and financial seriousness to make the claims representative of claims in each state.  
However, we do not weight the data by state to make the sample representative of claims in the 
four states.  Doing so would, naturally, apply much higher weights to observations from California 
and Texas.  In the regression analysis, this latter type of weighting would only matter if 
parameters differ across states, which is something we independently investigate in a number of 
ways.  Overall, the regression results suggest that by not weighting across states we, if anything, 
understate the strength of our conclusions, because the results on the effects of provider choice are 
strongest for California and Texas, the two largest states. 
9 There are some exceptions to these types of rules.  For example, in some employer-choice states, 
when the employer has established an approved network the worker must select within the 
network.  Typically, these should be thought of as broader networks, giving the worker a much 
wider array of choice, than the networks that are expected to develop under California’s recent 
reforms.  See Tanabe and Murray (2001). 
10 The prior/new question for initial provider was not asked of those for whom the initial provider  
 
was not primary. This was one of many compromises made in the design of the survey to reduce 
the scope to fit into the interview time limit.  We could still study initial, non-primary providers 
using these latter respondents for the two-way classification, but we do not since the three-way 
classification is of greater interest in light of recent reforms. 
11 For the period 2001-2003, the proportions of the population not covered by health insurance in 
our four states and in the United States were California – 18.7 percent, Massachusetts – 9.6 
percent, Pennsylvania – 10.7 percent, Texas – 24.6 percent  (highest in the nation), and United 
States – 15.1 percent (DeNavas-Walt, et al., 2004). 
12 The recovery measure used is the change from one week after the injury to the interview; in 
most cases this change is positive, but that is not imposed on the data since a worker’s health 
could worsen.  In addition, the severity control used in the regression models that follow is 
similarly defined as a change in levels – in this case from prior to the injury to one week after.  
Again, we do not impose that the worker’s health had to worsen, although it does in almost every 
case.  We also experimented with specifications defining each of these variables as relative 
measures – that is, we defined the percentage recovery relative to health status one week after the 
injury, and the percentage severity relative to health status prior to the injury.  The results were 
very similar.  We have some preference for the specification with changes in levels, because we do 
not think a full recovery from a very minor injury should be treated symmetrically to a full 
recovery from a very serious injury.  Put another way, we think it is important that the regression 
estimates of effects of provider choice on recovery reflect a large “penalty” for serious injuries 
that are not followed by substantial recovery, even if they are also associated with near-complete 
recoveries for very minor injuries. 
13 Victor, et al. (2003) provide extensive discussion of potential concerns about recall bias and  
 
other limitations, as well as evidence of validity of the health status measure from which both 
recovery and injury severity are derived.  Of specific concern, although the SF-12
® is designed to 
assess current health, in the survey it is also used retrospectively to assess health pre- and 
immediately post-injury.  As Victor, et al., show, retrospective measures based on the SF-12
® used 
in this survey match up well with results from the more standard, contemporaneous application of 
the SF-12
® in other studies.  In addition, although existing research has not directly explored the 
validity of retrospective application of the SF-12
® (or the longer SF-36
®), studies do validate 
retrospective recall of changes in health status with respect to prospective measurements based on 
the SF-36
® (Perneger, et al., 1996; Damiano, et. al, 1998).  Finally, in the particular application of 
the data that we explore, recall bias would be most problematic if it were correlated with provider 
choice, which seems unlikely.   
14 The methodology for scoring the SF-12
® is widely accepted and well-documented (Ware, et al., 
2002).  The mental health questions were only asked at the time of the interview, in part because 
of specific concerns about the difficulty of recalling mental health status, and also because asking 
all 12 questions about three periods would have significantly lengthened the time needed to 
conduct the entire survey.  This poses a problem because the overall scores for physical health and 
functioning based on the SF-12
® require information on mental health.  There are no significant 
differences (and the differences are trivial) in the responses to the mental health questions, at the 
time of the interview, between workers who chose their own provider and those for whom 
employers chose the provider.  To compute the SF-12
® scores, we assumed that the mental health 
scores at the time of the interview prevailed at the other times (pre- and immediately post-injury).  
We cannot, of course, verify this directly.  But the Victor, et al. (2003) study explored the 
sensitivity of the SF-12
® scores to using different extreme (best-case and worst-case) assumptions  
 
about mental health at these two times and found the physical health and functioning scores were 
very insensitive to the mental health responses (changing by only one percentage point in either 
direction relative to the physical health and functioning score using the actual mental health 
responses from the interview).  Thus, any bias from not having information on mental health pre- 
and immediately post-injury should be negligible.   
15 In some cases workers may be assigned multiple diagnosis codes during the course of their 
disability.  In such cases, we define a primary diagnosis code based on the code that receives the 
greatest expenditure.  Also, in some cases diagnosis codes are missing in the database.  In these 
cases, we use information from the payor about the nature of injury and part of body to assign the 
case to the appropriate injury group. 
16 See Appendix Table 1, in comparison to Tables 5 and 6. 
17 The TREATMENT variables in equation (1) are discussed below. 
18 The hazard function is more complicated, but an appealing feature of the function that results 
for the log-logistic distribution is that it is flexible, and can be increasing monotonically, 
decreasing monotonically, or first increasing and then decreasing, depending on the value of ￿.  
This contrasts with some more widely-used distributional assumptions that impose more 
restrictions on the hazard function. 
19 The implication of this is that the values of the regressors Z and the parameters ￿ exert a 
proportional shift on the odds ratio in equation (5) for all values of t.  That is, for any two 
individuals who have different Z’s but the same values of ￿, the odds of the spell lasting longer 
than t are constant for any t. 
20 In work with duration models there is sometimes attention given to the problem of unobserved 
heterogeneity.  We do not think this is critical in our context, for two reasons.  First, because we  
 
have very detailed controls we do not have reason to believe that there is an important role for 
unmeasured heterogeneity.  More important, the unique problem that unobserved heterogeneity 
introduces in duration models is bias in the estimates of parameters measuring duration 
dependence, because one cannot easily identify whether, for example, the probability of escaping 
from some status decreases over time because of duration dependence, or because the sample 
increasingly shifts towards those likely to have long durations.  By extension, bias will also be 
transmitted to coefficients of variables in duration models that are time varying.  But we have 
neither of these.  Rather, we simply have time-invariant controls that are unlikely to be affected by 
unobserved heterogeneity any more than would coefficients in a standard regression model.  So 
rather than use statistical tricks to address this problem in duration models (such as assuming a 
functional form for the heterogeneity and integrating out), we prefer to use the data to try to 
address the issue.  The place we think this is most important is with respect to the problem of 
unobserved injury severity, which we address in other ways as discussed below.   
21 These results are available from the authors upon request. 
22 We consider including these variables, but not attorney involvement, because hospitalization 
and surgery are sometimes likely to be dictated by medical exigencies.  At the same time, we 
recognize that it is possible that attorney involvement exacerbates the effects of employee choice 
of provider.  This raises interesting questions about how costs and outcomes – and their 
relationship to provider choice – might change were policies relating to use of attorneys in 
workers’ compensation cases altered; that question, however, is well beyond the scope of this 
study. 
23 Note that in the tables we report only the effects of provider choice and some other key 
variables on the outcomes.  Full regression results for are available from the authors upon request.  
 
24 The results in the third row of Table 6 come from including in the regression models a dummy 
variable for either type of employee choice, and also an interaction between this dummy variable 
and a dummy variable for employee choice of a new provider.  The estimated coefficient of the 
latter interaction measures the difference between the two types of employee choice, and a test of 
its statistical significance tells us whether the two types of employee choice have significantly 
different effects.  Note that in some cases the number reported in the third row is not simply the 
difference between the estimates reported in the first two rows of the table for the two types of 
employee choice, because the numbers reported in the table are in some cases calculated from the 
exponentials of the regression coefficients. 
25 Another potential argument for a relationship between unmeasured severity and employee 
choice of a new provider is that it arises by construction.  In particular, in employer choice states 
employee choice of a new provider is likely to coincide with having at least two providers – the 
initial one chosen by the employer and a subsequent one chosen by the employee.  If more serious 
or complex injuries are also associated with multiple providers, then this can lead to a systematic 
sorting of more serious cases into the employee choice of new provider category.  We examined 
the data and found that the share of claims involving two or more providers was in fact slightly 
lower (rather than higher) for claims with employee choice of new providers – both for the pooled 
data and each state separately.  We also examined this in a multivariate setting, estimating logit 
models for whether there were two or more providers, including as independent variables dummy 
variables for provider choice and all of the other controls included in Table 4.  Using the pooled 
data (with state dummy variables) and data for the states separately, the estimated differential 
associated with employee choice of a new provider was either zero or negative (rather than 
positive).  Indeed, the pattern of differences across states does not even suggest that in employer  
 
choice states there is a greater relative likelihood that employee choice of a new provider is 
associated with having multiple providers.  Thus, we conclude that employee choice of a new 
provider is not associated with a greater likelihood of having multiple providers, which we believe 
further rules out the likelihood of unmeasured severity differences associated with provider 
choice, especially of the type would generate higher costs and worse return to work for cases with 
employee choice of new providers.   